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ABSTRACT
Existing blockchain systems scale poorly because of their
distributed consensus protocols. Current attempts at improv-
ing blockchain scalability are limited to cryptocurrency. Scal-
ing blockchain systems under general workloads (i.e., non-
cryptocurrency applications) remains an open question.
In this work, we take a principled approach to apply sharding,
which is a well-studied and proven technique to scale out databases,
to blockchain systems in order to improve their transaction through-
put at scale. This is challenging, however, due to the fundamental
difference in failure models between databases and blockchain. To
achieve our goal, we first enhance the performance of Byzantine
consensus protocols, by doing so we improve individual shards’
throughput. Next, we design an efficient shard formation protocol
that leverages a trusted random beacon to securely assign nodes
into shards. We rely on trusted hardware, namely Intel SGX, to
achieve high performance for both consensus and shard formation
protocol. Third, we design a general distributed transaction protocol
that ensures safety and liveness even when transaction coordina-
tors are malicious. Finally, we conduct an extensive evaluation of
our design both on a local cluster and on Google Cloud Platform.
The results show that our consensus and shard formation protocols
outperform state-of-the-art solutions at scale. More importantly,
our sharded blockchain reaches a high throughput that can handle
Visa-level workloads, and is the largest ever reported in a realistic
environment.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain systems offer data transparency, integrity and im-
mutability in a decentralized and potentially hostile environment.
These strong security guarantees come at a dear cost to scalabil-
ity, for blockchain systems have to rely on distributed consensus
protocols which have been shown to scale poorly, both in terms of
number of transactions per second (tps) and number of nodes [21].
A number of works have attempted to scale consensus proto-
cols, the ultimate goal being able to handle average workloads of
centralized systems such as Visa. One scaling approach is to ex-
ploit trusted hardware [2, 4, 10]. However, its effectiveness has
not been demonstrated on data-intensive blockchain workloads.
The second approach is to use sharding, a well-studied and proven
technique to scale out databases, to divide the blockchain network
into smaller committees so as to reduce the overhead of consensus
protocols. Examples of sharded blockchains include Elastico [33],
OmniLedger [27] and RapidChain [49]. These systems, however,
are limited to cryptocurrency applications in an open (or permis-
sionless) setting. Since they focus on a simple data model, namely
the unspent transaction output (UTXO) model, these approaches
do not generalize to applications beyond Bitcoin.
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Figure 1: Sharding protocols in traditional databases vs.
blockchains.
In this paper, we take a principled approach to extend sharding
to permissioned blockchain systems. Existing works on sharded
blockchains target permissionless systems and focus on security.
Here, our focus is on performance. In particular, our goal is to de-
sign a blockchain system that can support a large network size
equivalent to that of major cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [41] and
Ethereum [13]. At the same time, it achieves high transaction
throughput that can handle the average workloads of centralized
systems such as Visa, which is around 2, 000−4, 000 transactions per
second [11]. Finally, the system supports any blockchain application
from domains such as finance [3], supply chain management [23]
and healthcare [36], not being limited to cryptocurrencies.
Sharding protocols have been extensively studied in distributed
database systems. A sharding protocol must ensure both atomic-
ity and isolation of transaction execution. State-of-the-art proto-
cols [22, 40, 48, 50] aim to improve performance for distributed
transactions in geo-replicated settings. However, they cannot be
directly extended to blockchain systems, due to a fundamental differ-
ence in the failure models that databases and blockchains consider.
Traditional databases assume the crash-failure model, in which a
faulty node simply stops sending and responding to requests. On
the other hand, blockchain systems operate in a more hostile envi-
ronment, therefore they assume a stronger failure model, namely
Byzantine failure, to account for malicious attackers. Figure 1 high-
lights the differences between distributed databases and sharded
blockchains.
The distinction in failure models leads to three challenges when
applying database sharding techniques to blockchains. First, high-
performance consensus protocols used in distributed databases [29,
42], cannot be applied to blockchains. Instead, blockchains rely on
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus protocols which have
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been shown to be a scalability bottleneck [21]. Thus, the first chal-
lenge is to scale BFT consensus protocols. Second, in a distributed
database any node can belong to any shard, but a blockchain must
assign nodes to shards in a secure manner to ensure that no shard
can be compromised by the attacker. The second challenge, there-
fore, is to achieve secure and efficient shard formation. Third, the
distributed database relies on highly available transaction coordi-
nators to ensure atomicity and isolation, but coordinators in the
blockchain may be malicious. Consequently, the third challenge is
to enable secure distributed transactions even when the coordinator
is malicious.
We tackle the first challenge, that of improving BFT consen-
sus protocols, by leveraging trusted execution environment (TEE)
(e.g., Intel SGX [35]) to eliminate equivocation in the Byzantine
failure model. Without equivocation, existing BFT protocols can
achieve higher fault tolerance with the same number of nodes (i.e.,
a committee of n nodes can tolerate up to n−12 non-equivocating
Byzantine failures, as opposed to n−13 failures in the original threat
model [10, 17, 30]). We introduce two major optimizations to the
TEE-assisted BFT consensus protocol to lower its communications
overhead, which further improves the system throughput at scale.
We leverage the TEE to design an efficient and secure shard
formation protocol, addressing the second challenge. More specifi-
cally, we implement a trusted randomness beacon inside the TEE
to generate unbiased random values in a distributed setting, which
achieves significant speed-up over existing cryptographic proto-
cols [38, 44]. Furthermore, we exploit the increased fault tolerance
of our TEE-assisted BFT consensus protocol to reduce the shard
size. In particular, to tolerate an attacker who controls 25% of the
network, our sharding protocol requires 80-node committees as
opposed to 600-node committees used in related works [27, 33].
We tackle the final challenge, that of enabling distributed trans-
actions for general blockchain applications, by using two classic
protocols, namely two-phase locking (2PL) and two-phase commit
(2PC). They ensure isolation and atomicity for cross-shard trans-
actions. Furthermore, they support any data model, as opposed to
UTXO-optimized protocols that do not generalize [49] beyond Bit-
coin. To prevent malicious transaction coordinators from causing
infinite blocking as in Omniledger [27], we design a protocol that
runs the 2PC’s coordination logic as a BFT replicated state machine.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present
a sharded blockchain that supports workloads other than
cryptocurrency and is able to scale to few thousands of trans-
actions per second.
• We present our design of a sharded blockchain consisting
of three key novelties: (i) optimizations that improve the
performance of the consensus protocol running within each
individual shard, (ii) an efficient shard formation protocol,
and (iii) a secure distributed transaction protocol that handles
cross-shard, distributed transactions.
• We conduct extensive, large-scale experiments to evaluate
the performance of our design. We run our experiments
on a local cluster with 100 nodes and on a realistic setup
consisting of over 1400 Google Cloud Platform (GPC) nodes
distributed across 8 regions. On GPC setup, we achieve a
throughput of over 3, 000 transactions per second which, to
the best of our knowledge, is the largest ever reported in a
realistic environment.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides background on database sharding techniques, blockchain
consensus protocols, and Intel SGX. Section 3 describes the key
challenges in extending database sharding to blockchain. Section 4
discusses how we improve the underlying consensus protocol run-
ning in each individual shard. Section 5 discusses the committee
formation protocol. Section 6 presents our distributed transaction
protocol. Section 7 reports the performance of our design. In Sec-
tion 8 we discuss the related work, before concluding in Section 9.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Sharding in Databases
Traditional database systems achieve scalability by dividing the
database states into independent shards (or partitions). By distribut-
ing the workload over multiple shards, the overall capacity of the
system increases. Sharding requires coordination to ensure ACID
properties for transactions that access multiple shards. Two impor-
tant coordination protocols are distributed commit such as two-
phase commit (2PC) which ensures atomicity, and concurrency
control such as two-phase locking (2PL) which achieves isolation.
In this paper, we use the term sharding to refer to the combination
of replication and partitioning as shown in Figure 1a. This architec-
ture is adopted by recent distributed database systems to achieve
fault tolerance and scalability [22]. Each partition is replicated over
multiple replicas, and its content is kept consistent by consensus
protocols [29, 42]. Transaction management and consensus proto-
cols can be combined more judiciously, as opposed to layering one
on top of another, to achieve better performance [40, 48, 50].
Sharding in database systems assumes crash-failure model, in
which a faulty node stops sending and responding to requests.
There are three important implications of this assumption. First,
efficient consensus protocols catered for crash-failure model can
be used to achieve high performance. Second, creating a shard is
simple. For example, a node can be assigned to a shard based on its
location. Third, the coordinators that drive coordination protocols
are fully trusted.
2.2 Blockchains Consensus Protocols
Blockchain is essentially a distributed, append-only ledger that
stores a sequence of transactions. The blocks are chained together
by cryptographic hash pointers. The blockchain is maintained by
a set of mutually distrusting nodes (a.k.a. replicas or validators).
These nodes run a consensus protocol to ensure the blockchain’s
consistency under Byzantine (or arbitrary) failures. This is in con-
trast to distributed databases whose threat model does not account
for Byzantine failures or malicious users [20].
Blockchain consensus protocols should achieve both safety and
liveness despite Byzantine failures. Safety means that honest (non-
Byzantine) nodes agree on the same value, whereas liveness means
that these nodes eventually agree on a value. Two major classes of
blockchain consensus protocols are Byzantine Fault Tolerance and
Nakamoto consensus.
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Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols. Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [15], the most well-known BFT protocol,
consists of three phases: a pre-prepare phase in which the leader
broadcasts requests as pre-prepare messages, the prepare phase
in which replicas agree on the ordering of the requests via prepare
messages, and the commit phase in which replicas commit to the
requests and their order via commit messages. Each node collects a
quorum of prepare messages before moving to the commit phase,
and executes the requests after receiving a quorum of commit mes-
sages. A faulty leader is replaced via the view change protocol. The
protocol uses O(N 2) messages for N replicas. For N ≥ 3f + 1, it
requires a quorum size of 2f + 1 to tolerate f failures. It achieves
safety in asynchronous networks, and liveness in partially synchro-
nous networks wherein messages are delivered within an unknown
but finite bound. More recent BFT protocols [32] extend PBFT to
optimize for the normal case (without view change).
Nakamoto consensus protocols. Proof-of-Work (PoW) [41],
as used in Bitcoin, is the most well-known instance of Nakamoto
consensus. The protocol randomly selects a leader to propose the
next block. Leader selection is a probabilistic process in which a
node must solve a computational puzzle to claim leadership. The
probability of solving the puzzle is proportional to the amount of
computational power the node possesses over the total power of
the network. The protocol suffers from forks which arise when
multiple nodes proposes blocks roughly at the same time. It has
low throughput, but can scale to a large number of nodes.
Nakamoto consensus protocols quantify Byzantine tolerance
in terms of the cumulative resources belonging to the Byzantine
nodes (e.g., fraction of the total computational power). Their safety
depends not only on the Byzantine threshold, but also on network
latency. Under a fully synchronous network, safety is guaranteed
against 50% Byzantine attackers [41]. However, this threshold drops
quickly in a partially synchronous network, going below 33% when
the latency is equal to the block time [43].
2.3 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
One approach to improve BFT protocols is to assume a hybrid fail-
ure model in which some components are trusted and only fail by
crashing, while others behave in a Byzantine manner. This model is
realized by running the trusted components inside a TEE. One im-
portant security guarantees of TEE is that it ensures the integrity of
the protected components, so that the attackers cannot tamper with
their execution and cause them to deviate from the prescribed pro-
tocols. Our work uses Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [35]
to provision the TEE. But we note that our design can work with
other TEE instantiations (e.g., TrustZone [8], Sanctum [18]).
Enclave protection. Intel SGX provides TEE support in the
form of hardware enclave. An enclave is a CPU-protected address
space which is accessible only by the code within the enclave (i.e.,
the trusted component). Multiple enclaves can be instantiated by
non-privileged user processes. The enclaves are isolated from each
other, from the operating system (OS) and from other user processes.
The enclave code, however, can invoke OS services such as IO and
memory management.
Attestation. A user can verify if a specific TEE is correctly
instantiated and running at a remote host via a remote attestation
protocol [9]. Once the enclave in question has been initiated, the
CPU computes a measurement of this enclave represented by the
hash of its initial state. The CPU then signs the measurement with
its private key. The user can verify the signed message, and then
compare the measurement against a known value.
Data sealing. The TEE can persist its state to non-volatile mem-
ory via the data sealing mechanism, which allows for recovery
after crash failures. An enclave seals its data by first requesting the
CPU for a unique key bound to its measurement, then encrypting
the data before storing it on persistent storage. This mechanism
ensures the data can only be decrypted by the enclave that sealed
it. However, enclave recovery is subject to rollback attacks wherein
an attacker (e.g., the malicious OS) provides properly sealed but
stale data to the enclave [34].
Other cryptographic primitives. SGX provides
sgx_read_rand and sgx_get_trusted_time functions to
the enclave processes. The former generates unbiased random
numbers, the latter returns the elapsed time relative to a reference
point.
3 OVERVIEW
In this section, we discuss our goals and illustrate them with a
running example. We detail the challenges in realizing these goals
and present our sharding approach. Finally, we describe the system
model and security assumptions.
3.1 Goals
The design of a highly scalable blockchain must meet the following
three goals: (i) support a large network size equivalent to that of
major cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, (ii) achieve high
transaction throughput that can handle the average workloads of
centralized systems such as Visa, and (iii) support general workloads
and applications beyond cryptocurrencies. The resulting blockchain
will enable scale-out applications that offer the security benefits of
a decentralized blockchain with a performance similar to that of
a centralized system. To better motivate and illustrate our design,
we use the following example throughout the paper.
Running example.Consider a consortium of financial institutions
that offer cross-border financial services to their customers. They
implement a blockchain solution that provides a shared ledger for
recording transactions which can be payments, asset transfers or
settlements. Unlike Bitcoin or Ripple [3], there is no native currency
involved. The ledger is distributed and its content is agreed upon by
consortium members via distributed consensus. Given the amount
of money at stake, the blockchain solution must be tolerant to
Byzantine failures, so that group members are protected against
attacks that compromise the ledger in order to double-spend or to
revoke transactions. As the consortium can admit new members,
the system should not assume any upper bound on the consortium
size. Finally, the blockchain must be able to support high request
rates and deliver high transaction throughput.
3.2 Challenges and Approach
Building a blockchain system that achieves all three goals above at
the same time is challenging. To have high transaction throughput
(second goal), it is necessary to build on top of a permissioned
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blockchain. But such a blockchain uses BFT protocols which do
not scale to a large number of nodes, thus contradicting the first
goal. As a result, one challenge is to reconcile the first two goals by
making BFT protocols more scalable. We note that scalability here
means fault scalability, which means that protocol’s performance
degrades gracefully as the number of tolerated failures increases.
We address this challenge by using trusted hardware to remove
the attacker’s ability to equivocate. Specifically, we use a hardware-
assisted PBFT protocol that requires only N = 2f + 1 replicas to
tolerate f failures. We implement this protocol on top of Hyper-
ledger’s PBFT implementation and further improve its scalability
by introducing two protocol-level optimizations that reduce the
number of message broadcasts, and an implementation-specific
optimization that avoids dropping important messages.
We cannot achieve the first two goals by improving BFT proto-
cols alone, because there is a limit on scalability due to the quadratic
communication cost of O(N 2). Our approach is to apply the data-
base sharding technique to partition the network and the blockchain
states into smaller shards, where each shard is small enough to run
a BFT protocol. In distributed databases, nodes can be assigned
to shards randomly or based on their location. But in blockchain,
the process of assigning nodes to shards, called shard formation,
must be done carefully to ensure security because each shard can
only tolerate a certain number of Byzantine failures. In particular,
given a network of N nodes, a fraction s of which are Byzantine,
shard formation must guarantee with overwhelming probability
that no shard of size n ≪ N contains more than f Byzantine nodes
over the entire lifetime of the system1. The relationship between f
and n depends on the consensus protocol. The challenge here is to
perform shard formation securely and efficiently. Existing solutions
use expensive cryptographic protocols and the resulting shards
are large. In contrast, we leverage TEE to implement an efficient
trusted randomness beacon that serves as the random source for
the shard formation. Furthermore, our fault-scalable PBFT protocol
allows for shards of smaller size. This leads to higher throughput
per shard, and more shards given the same network size.
As in distributed databases, sharding requires coordination pro-
tocols for cross-shard (or distributed) transactions. Two important
properties of coordination protocols are safetywhich means atomic-
ity and isolation, and livenesswhichmeans the transactionwill even-
tually abort or commit. The challenge in realizing our third goal is to
design a coordination protocol that supports non-UTXO distributed
transactions, while achieving safety and liveness even when the
coordinator is malicious. Existing sharded blockchains [27, 33, 49]
do not fully address this challenge, as we elaborate later in Section 6.
Our approach is to use the classic 2PC and 2PL protocols to ensure
safety, and run 2PC in a Byzantine tolerant shard to avoid malicious
blocking. This coordination protocol works for all blockchain data
models and applications.
The key components of our design are summarized in Figure 1b.
First, our shard formation protocol securely partitions the network
into multiple committees, thereby allowing the system throughput
to scale with the number of nodes in the system. This protocol relies
on a trusted randomness beacon implemented inside a TEE for
efficiency. Second, each shard runs our scalable BFT protocol which
1It must be the case that fn ≤ s in order for this requirement to be met.
achieves high throughput at scale by combining TEE with other
optimizations. Finally, layered on top of the shards is a distributed
transaction protocol that achieves safety and liveness for general
blockchain applications.
3.3 System and Threat Model
Systemmodel.We consider a blockchain system of N nodes, with
a fraction s of the network under the attacker’s control, while the
remaining fraction is honest. The shard formation protocol parti-
tions the nodes into k committees, each consisting of n ≪ N nodes.
Each committee can tolerate at most f < n Byzantine nodes. The
committees maintain disjoint partitions of the blockchain states (i.e.,
shards). Unless otherwise stated, the network is partially synchro-
nous, in which messages sent repeatedly with a finite time-out will
eventually be received. This is a standard assumption in existing
blockchain systems [27, 33].
In the running example above, suppose the consortium com-
prises 400 institutions, among which 100 members actively collude
so that they can revoke transactions that transfer their assets to the
remaining institutions. In such a case, N = 400 and s = 25%. Sup-
pose further that the consortium partitions their members into four
equally-sized committees, thenn = 100. Each committee owns a par-
tition of the ledger states. The committee members run a consensus
protocol to process transactions that access the committee’s states.
If PBFT is used, each committee can tolerate at most f = n−13 = 33
Byzantine nodes.
Every node in the system is provisioned with TEEs. We leverage
Intel SGX in our implementations, but our design can work with
any other TEE instantiations, for example hardware-based TEEs
such as TrustZone [8], Sanctum [18], TPMs [5], or software-based
TEEs such as Overshadow [16].
Threatmodel. The attacker has full control of the Byzantine nodes.
It can read and write to the memory of any running process, even
the OS. It can modify data on disk, intercept and change the con-
tent of any system call. It can modify, reorder and delay network
messages arbitrarily. It can start, stop and invoke the local TEE en-
claves with arbitrary input. However, its control of the enclaves is
restricted by the TEE threat model described below. The attacker is
adaptive, like in Elastico [33] and OmniLedger [27], meaning that it
can decide which honest nodes to corrupt. However, the corruption
does not happen instantly, like in Algorand [37], but takes some
time to come into effect. Furthermore, the attacker can only corrupt
up to a fraction of s nodes at a time. It is computationally bounded
and cannot break standard cryptographic assumptions. Finally, it
does not mount denial-of-service attacks against the system.
The threat model for TEE is stronger than what SGX currently
offers. In particular, SGX assumes that the adversary cannot com-
promise the integrity and confidentiality of protected enclaves. For
TEE, we also assume that integrity protection mechanism is se-
cure. But there is no guarantee about confidentiality protection,
except for a number of important cryptographic primitives: attes-
tation, key generation, random number generation, and signature.
In other words, enclaves have no private memory except for ar-
eas related to its private keys, i.e., they run in a seal-glassed proof
model where their execution is transparent [45]. This model admits
recent side-channel attacks on SGX that leak enclave data [12].
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Figure 2: Comparison of BFTprotocolswith varying number
of nodes and clients.
Although attacks that leak attestation and other private keys are
excluded [46], we note that there exist both software and hardware
techniques to harden important cryptographic operations against
side channel attacks.
4 SCALING CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
4.1 Scaling BFT Consensus Protocol
PBFT, the most prominent instance of BFT consensus protocols,
has been shown not to scale beyond a small number of nodes
due to its communication overhead [21]. In the running example,
this means each committee in the consortium can only comprise
dozens of institutions. Furthermore, the probability of the adversary
controlling more than a third of the committee is high when the
committee size is small. Our goal is to improve both the protocol’s
communication overhead and its fault tolerance.
Why PBFT? There are several BFT implementations for
blockchains. PBFT is adopted by Hyperledger. Tendermint [28]
– a variant of PBFT – is used by Ethermint and Cosmo. Istanbul
BFT (IBFT) is adopted by Quorum. Raft [42], which only tolerates
crash failures, is implemented by Coco to tolerate Byzantine fail-
ures by running the entire protocol inside Intel SGX [4]. Figure 2
compares the throughputs of these BFT implementations, where we
use Raft implementation in Quorum as an approximation for Coco
whose source code is not available. Due to space constraint, we only
highlight important results here, and include detailed discussion
in Appendix C.2. PBFT consistently outperforms the alternatives
at scale. The reason is that PBFT design permits pipelined execu-
tion, whereas IBFT and Tendermint proceed in lockstep. Although
pipelined execution is possible in Raft, this property is not exploited
in Quorum. From this observation, we base our sharded blockchain
design on top of Hyperledger, and focus on improving PBFT.
Reducing the number of nodes. If a consensus protocol can
prevent Byzantine nodes from equivocating (i.e., issuing conflict-
ing statements to different nodes), it is possible to tolerate up to
f = N−12 non-equivocating Byzantine failures out of N nodes [17].
Equivocation can be eliminated by running the entire consensus
protocol inside a TEE, thereby reducing the failure model from
Byzantine to crash failure [4]. We do not follow this approach, how-
ever, because it incurs a large trusted code base (TCB). A large TCB
is undesirable for security because it is difficult, if not impossible
to conduct security analysis for the code base, and it increases the
number of potential vulnerabilities [6]. Instead, we adopt the pro-
tocol proposed by Chun et al. [17] which uses a small trusted log
abstraction called attested append-only memory to remove equivo-
cation. The log is maintained inside the TEE so that the attacker
cannot tamper with its operations. We implement this protocol on
top of Hyperledger Fabric v0.6 using SGX, and call it AHL (Attested
HyperLedger).
AHL maintains different logs for different consensus message
types (e.g., pre-prepare, prepare, commit). Before sending out
a new message, each node has to append the message’s digest
to the corresponding log. The proof of this operation contains
the signature created by the TEE, and is included in the message.
AHL requires all valid messages to be accompanied by such proof.
Each node collects and verifies f + 1 prepare messages before
moving to the commit phase, and f + 1 commit messages before
executing the request. AHL periodically seals the logs and writes
them to persistent storage. This mechanism, however, does not
offer protection against rollback attacks [34]. We describe how to
extend AHL to guard against these attacks in Appendix A.
Optimizing communications. Our evaluation of AHL in Sec-
tion 7 shows that it fails to achieve the desired scalability. We ob-
serve a high number of consensus messages being dropped, which
leads to low throughput when the network size increases. From
this observation, we introduce two optimizations to improve the
communications of the system, and refer to the resulting imple-
mentation as AHL+.
First, we improve Hyperledger implementation which uses the
same network queue for both consensus and request messages. In
particular, we split the original message queue into two separated
channels, each for a different type of message. Messages received
from the network contain metadata that determines their types and
are forwarded to the corresponding channel. This separation pre-
vents request messages from overwhelming the queue and causing
consensus messages to be dropped.
Second, we note that when a replica receives a user request,
the PBFT protocol specification states that the request is broadcast
to all nodes [14]. However, this is not necessary as long as the
request is received at the leader, for the leader will broadcast the
request again during the pre-prepare phase. Therefore, we remove
the request broadcast. The replica receiving the request from the
client simply forwards it to the leader. We stress that this is a design-
level optimization.
We also consider another optimization adopted by Byzcoin [26],
in which the leader collects and aggregates other nodes’ messages
into a single authenticated message. Each node forwards its mes-
sages to the leader and verifies the aggregated message from the
latter. As a result, the communication overhead is reduced to O(N ).
This design, called AHLR (Attested HyperLedger Relay), is imple-
mented on top of AHL via an enclave that verifies and aggregates
messages. Given valid f + 1 signed messages for a request req, in
phase p of consensus round o, the enclave issues a proof indicating
that there has been a quorum for ⟨req,p,o⟩.
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Security analysis. The trusted log operations in AHL are secure
because they are signed by private keys generated inside the en-
clave. Because the adversary cannot forge signatures of the logs’
operations, it is not possible for the Byzantine nodes to equivocate.
As shown in [17], given no more than f = N−12 non-equivocating
Byzantine failures, AHL guarantees safety regardless of the net-
work condition, and liveness under partially synchronous network.
AHL+ only optimizes communication between nodes and does not
change the consensus messages, therefore it preserves AHL proper-
ties. AHLR only optimizes communication in the normal case when
there is no view change, and uses the same view change protocol
as in AHL. Because message aggregation is done securely within
the enclave, AHLR has the same safety and liveness guarantees as
AHL.
4.2 Scaling PoET Consensus Protocol
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) is a variant of Nakamoto consensus,
wherein nodes are provisioned with SGXs. Each node asks the
enclave for a randomized waitTime. Only after such waitTime
expires does the enclave issue a wait certificate or create a new
waitTime. The node with the shortest waitTime becomes the leader
and is able to propose the next block.
Similar to PoW, PoET suffers from forks and stale blocks. Due
to propagation delays, if multiple nodes obtain their certificates
roughly at the same time, they will propose conflicting blocks,
creating forks in the blockchain. The fork is resolved based on
the aggregate resource contributed to the branches, with blocks
on the losing branches discarded as stale blocks. Stale block rate
has a negative impact on both the security and throughput of the
system [25].
PoET+: Improving PoET. We improve PoET by restricting the
number of nodes competing to propose the next block, thereby
reducing the stale block rate. We call this optimized protocol PoET+.
Unlike PoET, when invoked to generate a wait certificate, PoET+
first uses sgx_read_rand to generate a random l-bit value q that is
bound to the wait certificate. Only wait certificates with q = 0 are
considered valid. The node with a valid certificate and the shortest
waitTime becomes the leader. PoET+ leader selection can thus be
seen as a two-stage process. The first stage samples uniformly at
random a subset of n′ = n · 2−l nodes. The second stage selects
uniformly at random a leader among thesen′ nodes. It can be shown
that the expected number of stale blocks in PoET+ is smaller than
that in PoET.
PoET+ vs AHL+. PoET+ safety depends not only on the Byzantine
threshold, but also on network latency. In a partially synchronous
network, its fault tolerance may drop below 33% [25]. This is in
contrast to AHL+ whose safety does not depend on network as-
sumption. More importantly, our performance evaluation of PoET+
(included in Appendix C) shows that it has lower throughput than
AHL+. Therefore, we adopt AHL+ for the design and implementa-
tion of the sharded blockchain.
5 SHARD FORMATION
Forming shards in a blockchain system is more complex than in
a distributed database. First, the nodes must be assigned to com-
mittees in an unbiased and random manner. Second, the size of
each committee must be selected carefully to strike a good trade-
off between performance and security. And finally, committee as-
signment must be performed periodically to prevent an adaptive
attacker from compromising a majority of nodes in a committee.
This section presents our approach of exploiting TEEs to address
these challenges.
5.1 Distributed Randomness Generation
A secure shard formation requires an unbiased random number
rnd to seed the node-to-committee assignment. Given rnd, the
nodes derive their committee assignment by computing a random
permutation π of [1 : N ] seeded by rnd. π is then divided into
approximately equally-sized chunks, each of which represents the
members in one committee.
We exploit TEEs to efficiently obtain rnd in a distributed and
Byzantine environment, by equipping each node with a Random-
nessBeacon enclave that returns fresh, unbiased random numbers.
Similar to prior works [27, 33, 49], we assume a synchronous net-
work with the bounded delay ∆ during the distributed randomness
generation procedure.
Our sharded blockchain systemworks in epochs. Each new epoch
corresponds to a new node-to-committee assignment. At the begin-
ning of each epoch, each node invokes the RandomnessBeacon
enclave with an epoch number e . The enclave generates two ran-
dom values q and rnd using two independent invocations of the
sgx_read_rand function. It then returns a signed certificate con-
taining ⟨e, rnd⟩ if and only if q = 0. The certificate is broadcast
to the network. After a time ∆, nodes lock in the lowest rnd they
receive for epoch e , and uses it to compute the committee assign-
ment.
The enclave is configured such that it can only be invoked once
per epoch, which is to prevent the attacker from selectively dis-
carding the enclave’s output in order to bias the final randomness.
If the nodes fail to receive any message after ∆, which happens
when no node can obtain ⟨e, rnd⟩ from its enclave, they increment
e and repeat the process. The probability of repeating the process
is Prepeat = (1− 2−l )N where l is the bit length of q. It can be tuned
to achieve a desirable trade-off between Prepeat and the communi-
cation overhead, which is O(2−lN 2). For example, when l = log(z)
for some constant z, Prepeat ≈ 0 and the communication is O(N 2).
When l = log(N ), Prepeat ≈ e−1 and the communication is O(N ).
Security analysis. Because q and rnd are generated independently
inside a TEE, their randomness is not influenced by the attacker.
Furthermore, the enclave only generates them once per epoch,
therefore the attacker cannot selectively discard the outputs to bias
the final result and influence the committee assignment.
5.2 Committee Size
Since committee assignment is determined by a random permuta-
tion π of [1 : N ] seeded by rnd, it can be seen as random sampling
without replacement. Therefore, we can compute the probability
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of a faulty committee (i.e., a committee containing more than f
Byzantine nodes) using the hypergeometric distribution. In par-
ticular, let X be a random variable that represents the number of
Byzantine nodes assigned to a committee of size n, given the overall
network size of N nodes among which up to F = sN nodes are
Byzantine. The probability of faulty committee, i.e., the probability
that security is broken, is:
Pr [X ≥ f ] =
n∑
x=f
(F
x
) (N−F
n−x
)(N
n
) (1)
Keeping the probability of faulty committee negligible. We
can bound the probability of faulty committee to be negligible
by carefully configuring the committee size, based on Equation 1.
If f ≤ n−13 (as in the case of PBFT), in the presence of a 25%
adversarial power, each committee must contain 600+ nodes to keep
the faulty committee probability negligible (i.e., Pr [X ≥ n−13 ] ≤
2−20). When AHL+ is used, each committee can tolerate up to
f = n−12 , thus the committees can be significantly smaller: n = 80
for Pr [X ≥ n−12 ] ≤ 2−20.
Smaller committee size leads to better performance for two rea-
sons. First, individual committees achieve higher throughput due to
lower communication overhead. Second, there are more committees
in the network, which can increase throughput under light con-
tention workloads. We report the committee sizes with respect to
different adversarial power and their impact on the overall through-
put in Section 7.
5.3 Shard Reconfiguration
An adaptive attacker may compromise a non-faulty committee by
corrupting otherwise honest nodes. Our threat model, however,
assumes that such node corruption takes time. As a result, we argue
that periodic committee re-assignment, or shard reconfiguration,
that reshuffles nodes among committees, suffices to guard the sys-
tem against an adaptive attacker.
Shard reconfiguration occurs at every epoch. At the end of epoch
e − 1, nodes obtain the random seed rnd following the protocol
described in Section 5.1. They compute the new committee assign-
ment for epoch e based on rnd. We refer to nodes whose committee
assignment changes as transitioning nodes. We refer to the period
during which transitioning nodes move to new committees as the
epoch transition period.
During epoch transition, transitioning nodes first stop process-
ing requests of their old committees, then start fetching the states
of their new committees from current members of the correspond-
ing committees. Only after the state fetching completes do they
officially join the new committee and start processing transactions
thereof. During this period, the transitioning nodes do not partici-
pate in the consensus protocol of either their old or new committees.
Consequently, a naive reconfiguration approach in which all nodes
transition at the same time is undesirable, as it renders the system
non-operational during the transition period.
Our approach is to have nodes transitioning in batches. In particu-
lar, for each committee, only up to B nodes move to new committees
at a time. The order by which nodes move is determined based on
rnd, which is random and unbiased. In the following, we reason
about the impact of B on the safety and liveness of the sharded
blockchain.
Safety analysis. Let k be the number of shards, where each shard
represents a partition of the global blockchain states. A shard re-
configuration essentially changes the set of nodes that processes
requests for each of the k shards. Consider a shard sh, and denote
the committee handling sh in epoch e − 1 by Ce−1 and in epoch e
by Ce . Since B nodes are switching out of Ce−1 at a time, and there
are nk nodes of Ce−1 expected to remain in Ce , there are
n(k−1)
k ·B
intermediate committees handling sh during the epoch transition
period.
Swapping out B nodes does not violate safety of sh, because
the number of Byzantine nodes in the current committee does not
increase. On the other hand, when new B nodes are swapped in,
the number of Byzantine nodes in the intermediate committee may
exceed the safety threshold. As the transitioning nodes are chosen at
random based on rnd, the probability of the intermediate committee
being faulty follows Equation 1. In expectation, there are n(k−1)k ·B
such intermediate committees during the transitioning from Ce−1
to Ce . We use Boole’s inequality to estimate the probability that
the safety of shard sh is violated during the epoch transitioning:
Pr (faulty) ≤
n(k−1)
k ·B∑
i=1
n∑
x=f
(F
x
) (N−F
n−x
)(N
n
) (2)
For example, withn = 80, f = n−12 ,k = 10 shards, and B = log(n) =
6, Pr (faulty) ≈ 10−5. Based on Equation 2, we can configure B to
balance between liveness and safety of the system during epoch
transition.
Liveness analysis. During the transitioning, each committee has
B nodes not processing requests. If B > f , the shard cannot make
progress because the remaining nodes cannot form a quorum. Thus,
the larger B is, the higher the risk of loss of liveness during epoch
transition.
6 DISTRIBUTED TRANSACTIONS
In this section, we explain the challenges in supporting distributed,
general transactions for blockchains. We discuss the limitations
of state-of-the-art systems: RapidChain [49] and OmniLedger [27]
(Elastico [33] is not considered because it does not support dis-
tributed transactions). We then present a solution that enables
fault-tolerant, distributed, general transactions, and discuss how it
can be improved.
6.1 Challenges
In a sharded blockchain, a distributed (or cross-shard) transaction
is executed at multiple shards. Appendix B shows that in practical
blockchain applications, a vast majority of transactions are dis-
tributed. Similar to databases, supporting distributed transactions
is challenging due to the safety and liveness requirements. The
former means atomicity and isolation that handle failures and con-
currency, the latter means that transactions do not block forever.
We note that in the sharded blockchain, concurrency does not arise
within a single shard, because the blockchain executes transaction
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Figure 3: Existing works’ coordination protocols. C denotes
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Figure 4: Account-based cross-shard transactions.
sequentially. Instead, as we explain later, concurrency arises due to
cross-shard transactions.
UTXO transactions. Bitcoin and many other cryptocurren-
cies adopt the Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) data model. A
UTXO transaction consists of a list of inputs, and a list of outputs.
All the inputs must be the outputs of previous transactions that
are unspent (i.e., they have not been used in another transaction).
The outputs of the transaction are new, unspent coins. Given a
transaction, the blockchain nodes check that its inputs are unspent,
and the sum of the outputs is not greater than that of the inputs.
If two transactions consume the same unspent coins, only one is
accepted.
The simplicity of UTXO model is exploited in previous works
to achieve atomicity without using a distributed commit protocol.
Consider a simple UTXO transaction tx = ⟨(I1, I2),O⟩ that spends
coins I1, I2 in shard S1 and S2, respectively, to create a new coin
O belonging to shard S3 (Figure 3a). RapidChain [49] executes tx
by splitting it into three sub-transactions: txa = ⟨I1, I ′1⟩, txb =⟨I2, I ′2⟩, txc = ⟨(I ′1, I ′2),O⟩, where I ′1 and I ′2 belong to S3. txa and
txb essentially transfer I1 and I2 to the output shard, which are
spent by txc to create the final outputO . All three sub-transactions
are single-shard. In case of failures, when, for example, txb fails
while txa succeeds, RapidChain sidesteps atomicity by informing
the owner of I1 to use I ′1 for future transactions, which has the same
effect as rolling back the failed tx .
RapidChain does not achieve isolation. Consider another trans-
action tx ′b in S2 that spends I2 and is submitted roughly at the same
time as tx , the shard serializes the transactions, thus only one of txb
and tx ′b succeeds. If isolation is achieved, either tx or tx
′
b succeeds.
But it is possible in RapidChain that both of them fail, because txa
fails.
R
S1 S2 S3
PrepareTx
S1 S2 S3
R
PrepareOKs
S1 S2 S3
R
CommitTx
(1a) Prepare (1b) Pre-Commit (2) Commit
Figure 5: Our coordination protocol.
Safety for general transaction model.We now show exam-
ples demonstrating how RapidChain’s approach fails to work for
non-UTXO distributed transactions, because it violates both atom-
icity and isolation. Consider the account-based data model, which
is used in Ethereum. Let tx1: ⟨acc1+acc3⟩ → ⟨acc2⟩ be a transac-
tion transferring assets from acc1 and acc3 to acc2, where acc1,acc2
belongs to shard S1 and acc3 belongs to shard S2. Following Rapid-
Chain, tx1 is split into op1a ,op1b ,op1c (Figure 4). If op1a succeeds
and op1b fails, due to insufficient funds, for example, op1c cannot be
executed. In other words, tx1 does not achieve atomicity because
it is executed only partially: acc1 is already debited and cannot be
rolled back.
Let tx2: ⟨acc3⟩ → ⟨acc4⟩ be another transaction submitted
roughly at the same time as tx1. In Figure 4, the execution sequence
⟨op1a ,op1b ,op2a ,op2b ,op1c ⟩ is valid in RapidChain, but it breaks
isolation (serializability) because tx2 sees the states of a partially
completed transaction.
Liveness under malicious coordinator. OmniLedger [27]
achieves safety for the UTXO model by relying on a client to co-
ordinate a lock/unlock protocol (Figure 3b). Given a transaction
tx whose inputs belong to shard S1 and S2, and output belongs to
shard S3, the client first obtains locks from S1 and S2 (i.e., mark-
ing the inputs as spent), before instructing S3 to commit tx . This
client-driven protocol suffers from indefinite blocking if the client
is malicious. For example, consider a payment channel [31, 39], in
which the payee is the client that coordinates a transaction that
transfers funds from a payer’s account. A malicious payee may pre-
tend to crash indefinitely during the lock/unlock protocol, hence,
the payer’s funds are locked forever.
6.2 Our Solution
We aim to design a distributed transaction protocol that achieves
safety for general blockchain transactions (non-UTXO), and live-
ness against malicious coordinators. For safety, we use the classic
two-phase commit (2PC) and two-phase locking (2PL) protocol as
in traditional databases. To guard against a malicious coordinator,
we employ a Byzantine fault-tolerant reference committee, denoted
by R, to serve as a coordinator. R runs BFT consensus protocol
and implements a simple state machine for 2PC. Given our system
and threat model in Section 3.3, R is highly (eventually) available.
Figure 5 illustrates the transaction flow and Figure 6 depicts the
state machine of the reference committee.
The client initiates a transaction tx by sending BeginTx request
to the reference committee. The transaction then proceeds in three
steps.
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tion management protocol (i.e., bottom half) and the origi-
nal 2PC protocol (i.e., top half).
1a) Prepare: Once R has executed the BeginTx request, it enters
Started state. Nodes in R then send PrepareTx requests to the trans-
action committees (or tx-committees). The latter wait for a quorum
of matching PrepareTx to ensure that BeginTx has been executed
in R. Each tx-committee executes the PrepareTx. If consensus is
reached that tx can be committed, which requires that tx can obtain
all of its locks, the nodes within the committee send out PrepareOK
messages (or PrepareNotOK messages otherwise).
1b) Pre-Commit: When entering Started state, R initializes a
counter c with the number of tx-committees involved in tx . Af-
ter receiving the first quorum of matching responses from a tx-
committee, it either decreases c and enters the Preparing state, or
enters the Aborted state, depending on whether the responses are
PrepareOK or PrepareNotOK respectively. R stays in the Prepar-
ing states and decreases c for every new quorum of PrepareOK
responses. It moves to Aborted as soon as it receives a quorum of
PrepareNotOK, and to Committed states when c = 0.
2) Commit: Once R has entered Committed (or Aborted) state,
the nodes in R send out CommitTx (or AbortTx) messages to tx-
committees. The latter wait for a quorum of matching messages
from R before executing the corresponding commit or abort opera-
tion.
We remark that the reference committee is not a bottle-neck
in cross-shard transaction processing, for we can scale it out by
running multiple instances of R in parallel.
Safety analysis. The safety of our coordination protocol is based
on the assumption that both R and tx-committees ensure safety for
all transactions/requests they process. This assumption is realized
by fine-tuning the committee size according to Equation 1 presented
in Section 5.2.
We sketch the proof that our coordination protocol indeed im-
plements the classic 2PC protocol in which reference committee R
is the coordinator, and tx-committees are the participants. The state
machine of the reference committee shown in Figure 6 is identical
to that of the coordinator in the original 2PC [24].
Figure 7 illustrates the correspondence between our protocol
and the original 2PC protocol. Similar to 2PC, our protocol consists
of two main phases. Phase 1 aims to reach the tentative agreement
of transaction commit and Phase 2 performs the actual commit
of the transaction among shards. Before BeginTx is executed at R,
the transaction is considered non-existent, hence no tx-committees
would accept it. After R enters Started state (i.e., it has logged the
transaction), the PrepareTx requests are sent to tx-committees.
Phase 1 completes when R moves either to Committed or Aborted
state. At this point, the current state of R reflects the tentative
agreement of transaction commit. When this tentative agreement
is conveyed to the tx-committees in Phase 2, they can commit (or
abort) the transaction. The original 2PC requires logging at the
coordinator and participants for recovery. Our protocol, however,
does not need such logging, because the states of R and of tx-
committees are already stored on the blockchain. In summary, our
protocol always achieves safety for distributed transactions.
Liveness analysis. Recall that we assume a partially synchronous
network, in which messages sent repeatedly with a finite time-
out will eventually be received. Furthermore, we assume that the
size of R is chosen such that the number of Byzantine nodes are
less than half. Under these assumptions, the BFT protocol running
in R achieves liveness. In other words, R always makes progress,
and any request sent to it will eventually be processed. Such even-
tual availability means that R will not block indefinitely. Thus, the
coordination protocol achieves liveness.
6.3 Implementation
We implement our protocol on Hyperledger Fabric which supports
smart contracts called chaincodes. The blockchain states are mod-
eled as key-value tuples and accessible to the chaincode during
execution. We use the chaincode that implements the SmallBank
benchmark to explain our implementation. In Hyperledger, this
chaincode contains a sendPayment function that reads the state
representing acc1’s balance, checks that it is greater than bal , then
deducts the bal from acc1 and updates the state representing acc2’s
balance. This chaincode does not support sharding, because the
states of acc1 and acc2 may belong to different shards. We modify
the chaincode so that it can work with our protocol. In particu-
lar, for the sendPayment function, we split it into three functions:
preparePayment, commitPayment, and abortPayment. We imple-
ment locking for an account acc by storing a boolean value to a
blockchain state with the key “L_”acc . During the execution of
preparePayment, the chaincode checks if the corresponding lock,
namely the tuple ⟨L_acc, true⟩, exists in the blockchain state, and
aborts the transaction if it does. If it does not, the chaincode writes
the lock to the blockchain. The commitPayment function for a trans-
action tx writes new states (balances) to the blockchain, and re-
moves the locks that were written for tx .
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Table 1: Comparisons with other sharded blockchains.
# machines Over-subscription
Transaction
model
Distributed
transaction
Elastico 800 2 UTXO ×
OmniLedger 60 67 UTXO ×
RapidChain 32 125 UTXO ✓
Ours 1400 1 Generalworkload ✓
As an optimization to avoid cross-shard communication in nor-
mal case (when clients are honest), we let the clients collect and
relay messages between R and tx-committees. We directly exploit
the blockchain’s ledger to record the progress of the commit proto-
col. In particular, during Prepare phase, the client sends a transac-
tion to the blockchain that invokes the preparePayment function.
This function returns an error if the Prepare phase fails. The client
reads the status of this transaction from the blocks to determines if
the result is PrepareOK or PrepareNotOK. We implement the state
machine of the reference committee as a chaincode with similar
functions that can be invoked during the two phases of our protocol.
When interacting with R, all transactions are successful, therefore
the client only needs to wait for them to appear on the blocks of R.
6.4 Discussion
Our current design uses 2PL for concurrency control, whichmay not
be able to extract sufficient concurrency from theworkload. State-of-
the-art concurrency control protocols have demonstrated superior
performance over 2PL [40, 48]. We note that the batching nature
of blockchain presents opportunities for optimizing concurrency
control protocols. We leave the study of these protocols to future
work.
In the current implementation, we manually refactor existing
chaincodes to support sharding. One immediate extension that
makes it easier to port legacy blockchain applications to our system
is to instrument Hyperledger codebase with a library containing
common functionalities for sharded applications. One common
function is state locking. Having such a library helps speed up
the refactoring, but the developer still needs to split the original
chaincode function to smaller functions that process the Prepare,
Commit or Abort requests. Therefore, a more useful extension is
to add programming language features that, given a single-shard
chaincode implementation, automatically analyze the functions
and transform them to support multi-shards execution. Another
extension to improve usability is to introduce a client library that
hides the details of the coordination protocols, so that the users
only see single-shard transactions.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present a comprehensive evaluation of our design.
We first demonstrate the performance of the scalable consensus
protocols. Next, we report the efficiency of our shard formation pro-
tocol. Finally, we evaluate the scalability of our sharding approach.
Table 1 contrasts our design and evaluation methodology against
existing sharded blockchain systems.
For this evaluation, we use KVStore and Smallbank, two different
benchmarks available in BLOCKBENCH [21] — a framework for
benchmarking private blockchains. We use the original client driver
Table 2: Runtime costs of enclave operations (excluding en-
clave switching cost which is roughly 2.7µs).
Operations Time (µs)
ECDSA Signing 458.4(±0.4)
ECDSA Verfication 844.2(±0.8)
SHA256 2.5(±0.1)
AHL Append 465.3(±0.8)
AHLR Message Aggregation (f = 8) 8031.2(±2.3)
RandomnessBeacon 482.2(±0.5)
in BLOCKBENCH, which is open-loop, for our single-shard experi-
ments. For multi-shard experiments, we modified the driver to be
closed-loop (i.e., it waits until a cross-shard transaction finishes
before issuing a new one). To generate cross-shard transactions, we
modified the original KVStore driver to issue 3 updates per transac-
tion, and used the original sendPayment transaction in Smallbank
that reads and writes two different states.
We conducted experiments in two different settings. One is an in-
house (local) cluster consisting of 100 servers, each equipped with
Intel Xeon E5-1650 3.5GHz CPUs, 32GB RAM and 2TB hard drive. In
this setting, the blockchain node and client run on separate servers.
The other setting is Google Cloud Platform (GCP), in which we have
separate instances for the clients and for the nodes. A client has 16
vCPUs and 32GB RAM, while a node has 2 vCPUs and 12GB RAM.
We use up to 1400 instances over 8 regions (the latency between
regions is included in Appendix C).
We used Intel SGX SDK [1] to implement the trusted code base.
Since SGX is not available on the local cluster and GCP, we config-
ured the SDK to run in simulation mode. We measured the latency
of each SGX operation on Skylake 6970HQ 2.80 GHz CPU with
SGX Enabled BIOS support, and injected it to the simulation. Table
2 details runtime costs of enclave operations on the SGX-enabled
processor. Public key operations are expensive: signing and signa-
ture verification take about 450µs and 844µs , respectively. Context
switching and other symmetric key operations take less than 5µs .
We also measured the cost of remote attestation protocol, which is
carried out between nodes of the same committee in order to verify
that they are running the correct enclave. On our SGX-enabled
processor, this protocol takes around 2ms , but we note that it is
executed only once per epoch, and its results can be cached.
The results reported in the following are averaged over ten inde-
pendent runs. Due to space constraints, we focus on throughput
performance in this section, and discuss other results in the Appen-
dix.
7.1 Fault-scalable consensus
AHL+ vs. other variants.We compare the performance of AHL+
with the original PBFT protocol (denoted by HL), AHL and AHLR.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the throughput with increasing number
of nodes, N , on the local cluster and on GCP, when using KVStore
benchmark with 10 clients. The performance with varying number
of clients and fixed N is included in the Appendix.
AHL’s throughput is similar to that of HL, but for the same N
it tolerates more failures. Both HL and AHL show no throughput
for N > 67 on the local cluster, and no throughput at all on GCP.
We observe that these systems are livelocked when N increases,
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Figure 8: AHL+ performance on local cluster.
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Figure 10: Effect of optimizations on throughput.
as they are stuck in the view-change phase. The number of view
changes is reported in the Appendix. In contrast, both AHL+ and
AHLR maintain throughputs above 700 transactions per second
in the cluster and above 200 on GCP. Interestingly, AHL+ demon-
strates consistently higher throughput than AHLR, even though the
former has O(N 2) communication overhead compared to O(N ) of
the latter. Careful analysis of AHLR shows that the leader becomes
the single point of failure. If the leader fails to collect and multicast
the aggregate message before the time out, the system triggers the
view change protocol which is expensive.
To understand the impact of Byzantine behavior on the overall
performance, we simulate an attack in which the Byzantine nodes
send conflicting messages (with different sequence numbers) to
different nodes. Figure 8 (right) shows how the throughput deteri-
orates when the number of failures increases. We note that for a
given f , HL runs with N = 3f + 1 nodes, whereas AHL, AHL+ and
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Figure 12: Performance during shard reconfiguration.
AHLR run with N = 2f + 1 nodes. Despite the lower throughputs
than without failures, we observe a similar trend in which AHL+
outperforms the other protocols. On GCP with more than 1 zone,
the Byzantine behavior causes all protocols to livelock.
Finally, we examine how each optimization presented in Sec-
tion 4.1 contributes to the final performance. Figure 10 shows,
against the baseline of original PBFT implementation (HL), the
effect of adding trusted hardware (AHL), optimization 1 (separating
message queues), optimization 2 (removing request), and optimiza-
tion 3 (message aggregation at the leader). The experiments, which
are run on our local cluster with 10 clients, show that optimization
2 adds the most benefits when there is no failure, whereas optimiza-
tion 1 is the best under Byzantine failures. This explains why AHL+,
which incorporates both optimizations, has the best performance.
7.2 Shard Formation
Figure 11 compares our shard formation protocol with Om-
niLedger’s in terms of committee size and running time. With in-
creasing Byzantine failures, OmniLedger needs exponentially larger
committees. On the other hand, by leveraging AHL+, our protocol
keeps the committees up to two orders of magnitude smaller.
We compare the cost of our distributed random number gener-
ation protocol with that of Randhound used in OmniLedger. We
vary the network size from 32 to 512 nodes. On the local cluster,
we oversubscribe each physical server by a factor of 8, running
each node in a single-threaded virtual machine. On GCP, each
node runs on an instance with 2 vCPUs. Recall that both proto-
cols assume a synchronous network with the bounded delay ∆.
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Figure 14: Sharding performance on GCP.
We empirically derive ∆ by measuring the maximum propagation
delay in different network sizes for a 1KB message, then conserva-
tively setting ∆ to be 3× the measured value. On the local cluster,
∆ ranges from 2 to 4.5s. On GCP, ∆ ranges from 5.9 to 15s. We
set q = log(N ) − log(log(N )), so that the communication over-
head is O(N log(N )) and Pr epeat < 2−11. For Randhound, we set
c = 16 as suggested in [27]. Figure 11 shows that our protocol is
up to 32× and 21× faster than RandHound on the local cluster and
GCP, respectively. We attribute this gap to the difference in their
communication complexity: O(N log(N )) versus O(Nc2).
Shard Reconfiguration. Next, we analyze the performance of
our system during epoch transition (or resharding). We consider
the naive approach which swaps all nodes by first stopping them,
assigning them to new shards based on a randomly generated per-
mutation, and then starting them again. We compare it with our
approach which swaps B nodes at a time. In our evaluation, we set
B = log(n).
Figure 12 shows the throughput against the baseline where there
is no resharding. We run the experiments on our local clusters with
two shards, each containing up to 33 nodes. We perform the re-
sharding twice, as depicted in Figure 12 (right). The naive approach
shows a sharp drop in throughput when all nodes are restarted,
followed by a period of up to 80s in which nodes discover their new
peers, verify and synchronize their states. The subsequent spikes
in throughput are due to nodes processing transactions from their
backlog. In contrast, our approach allows the system to maintain
the same throughput as the baseline.
7.3 Sharding performance
We first evaluate the performance of the coordination protocol by
running many shards on the local cluster with f = 1. To satu-
rate S shards, we use 4S clients, each maintaining 128 outstanding
requests to the shard. Figure 13 (left) reports the throughput for
Smallbank with network size of up to 36 nodes. The results for KV-
Store are similar and are included in the Appendix. When HL-based
sharding is used (as in OmniLedger), there are up to 9 shards in
total. Our sharding protocol uses AHL+, therefore allowing for up
to 12 shards. It can be seen that the overall throughput of the sys-
tem scales linearly with the number of shards. Furthermore, when
the reference committee is involved, it becomes the bottleneck as
the number of shards grows. We vary the skewness factor (Zipf
coefficient) of the workload, and show the effect of contention on
the overall throughput in Figure 13 (right). As expected, the abort
rate increases with the Zipf value.
Finally, we evaluate the throughput scalability of our sharded
blockchain system in a large-scale, realistic network environment.
For this experiment, we run Smallbank without the reference com-
mittee, using up to 972 nodes and 432 clients spanning 8 regions on
GCP. We consider two adversarial powers: 12.5% and 25%which are
studied in other sharded blockchains [27, 33]. The former requires
a committee size of 27 nodes, and the latter of 79 nodes to keep
the probability of faulty committee below 2−20. Figure 14 shows
the overall throughput and the corresponding number of shards
for the two adversarial powers. It can be seen that the throughput
scales linearly with the number of shards. In particular, for 12.5%
adversary we achieve over 3, 000 transactions per second using
36 shards, which is expected to grow higher with more shards2.
For 25% adversary, we observe a throughput of 954 transactions
per second which is higher than that of OmniLedger with regular
validations [27].
8 RELATEDWORKS
We have discussed three related sharded blockchains, namely Elas-
tico, OmniLedger and RapidChain, extensively in the previous sec-
tions. Another related system is Chainspace [7] which proposes a
sharding protocol for blockchain applications that are more general
than cryptocurrencies. It allows smart contracts to assign nodes to
shards, as opposed to using a distributed shard formation protocol.
We do not consider Chainspace in this work, due to its complex
transactionmodel, complex coordination protocol, and low through-
put of only 300 transactions per second even with 10 shards.
Scaling blockchain with database techniques. Various works
have exploited database techniques to improve aspects of the
blockchain software stack other than the consensus layer. Fork-
base [47] is the first storage designed for blockchains, supporting
analytical queries at a much lower cost than the current key-value
backends. Dickerson et al. [19] add concurrency to Ethereum ex-
ecution engine by using software transaction memory primitives.
We expect more works in improving the blockchain storage and
execution engine. While orthogonal to ours, they can be combined
to enable scalable blockchains with richer functionalities.
2 We were unable to obtain enough resources to run with more shards at the time of
writing.
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Off-chain scaling. Instead of directly improving blockchain com-
ponents, another approach to scalability is to move as many trans-
actions off the blockchain as possible. Such off-chain solutions allow
users to execute transactions and reach consensus directly among
each other, requiring minimal interaction with the blockchain. The
blockchain is used only for disputes and settlements. Examples of
off-chain solutions include payment channels [31] and state chan-
nels [39].
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we applied database sharding techniques to
blockchains. We identified challenges that arise from the funda-
mental difference in failure models between traditional distributed
databases and blockchain systems. We addressed them by lever-
aging TEEs to design fault-scalable consensus protocols and an
efficient shard formation protocol. Furthermore, we proposed a
coordination protocol for cross-shard transactions that supports
general blockchain workloads. The coordination protocol employs
a Byzantine fault-tolerant reference committee to guards against
malicious coordinators. Finally, we conducted extensive, large-scale
evaluation of our designs in realistic network settings, achieving
over 3, 000 transactions per second with many shards.
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A DEFENSES AGAINST ROLLBACK ATTACKS
Data sealing mechanism enables enclaves to save their states to per-
sistent storage, allowing them to resume their operations upon
recovery. However, enclave recovery is vulnerable rollback at-
tack [34].
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AHL+. The adversary can cause the enclave of AHL+ to restart, and
supply it with a stale log heads upon its resumption. The enclave
resuming with stale log heads “forgets” all messages appended after
the stale log heads, allowing the adversary to equivocate.
Denote byH the sequence number of the last consensus message
the enclave processes prior to its restart. The recovering enclave
must not accept any message with a sequence number lower than
or equal to H . We derive an estimation procedure that allows the
resuming enclave to estimate an upper bound, HM , on the latest
sequence number it would have observed if it were not crashed.
The goal of this estimation is to guarantee that HM ≥ H , ensuring
protocol’s safety.
The enclave starts the estimation procedure by querying all its
peers for the sequence number of their last checkpoint, denoted
by ckp. The resuming enclave uses the responses to select ckpM ,
which is a value ckp it receives from one node j such that there
are f replicas other than j reporting values less than or equal to
ckpM . It then sets the value HM to HM = L + ckpM where L is a
preset difference between the node’s high and low watermarks. The
test against ckp responses of f other replicas ensures that ckpM
is greater than the sequence number of any stable checkpoint the
resuming enclave may have; otherwise, there must be at least f
ckp responses that are larger than ckpM , which is not possible due
to quorum intersection.
The resuming enclave will not append any message to its logs
until it is fully recovered. This effectively refrains its host node from
sending anymessage or processing any request, for the node cannot
obtain the proof of append operation generated by the enclave. The
enclave is fully recovered only after it is presented with a correct
stable checkpoint with a sequence number greater than or equal to
HM . At this point, it starts accepting append operations, and the
host node can actively participate in the protocol. Since HM is an
upper bound on the sequence number the AHL+ enclave would
observe had it not been crashed, and that the host node cannot
send any message with a sequence number lower than HM once
its enclave is restarted, the protocol is safe from equivocation.
RandomnessBeacon. The random values q and rnd are bound
to the epoch number e and a counter v to prevent the adversary
from selectively discarding the enclave’s output to bias the random-
ness. These values, nonetheless, are stored in the enclave’s volatile
memory. The adversary may attempt to restart the enclave and
invoke it using the same epoch number e to collect different values
of q and rnd. Fortunately, the adversary only has a window of ∆
from the beginning of epoch e to bias its q and rnd in that same
epoch (after ∆, nodes have already locked the value of rnd used in
epoch e). Thus, to prevent the adversary from restarting the enclave
to bias q and rnd, it suffices to bar the enclave from issuing these
two random values for any input e , 0 for a duration of ∆ since
its instantiation. The genesis epoch requires a more subtle set-up
wherein participants are forced to not restart their enclaves during
that first epoch. This can be realized by involving the use of CPU’s
monotonic-counter. Such process needs to be conducted only once
at the system’s bootstrap.
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Figure 15: AHL+ latency on local cluster and GCP.
B PROBABILITY OF CROSS-SHARD
TRANSACTIONS
We examine the probability that a transaction is cross-shard (i.e.,
it affects multiple shards’ states at the same time). Consider a d-
argument transaction tx that affects the values (states) of d dif-
ferent arguments. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
arguments are mapped to shards uniformly at random, based on
the randomness provided by a cryptographic hash function applied
on the arguments. Let k be the total number of shards formed in
the system. The probability that the transaction tx affects the states
of exactly x ≤ min(d,k) shards can be calculated based on the
multinomial distribution as follows:
x−1∏
i=1
k − i
k
∑
p1+p2+px=d−x
x∏
j=1
( j
k
)pj (3)
While OmniLedger and RapidChain give a similar calculation,
they only consider a specific type of UTXO transactions whose
outputs are all managed by a single output committee. Unfortu-
nately, such calculation does not extend to UTXO transactions
whose outputs belong to separate committees, let alone non-UTXO
distributed transactions.
C ADDITIONAL EVALUATION RESULTS
This section provides additional results to those discussed in Sec-
tion 7. First, the latency among the 8 GPC regions used in our
experiments is listed in Table 3. Figure 15 and 16 show the latency
and number of view-changes in different consensus protocols as
the network size increases. Figure 17 presents the cost breakdown
for a block of transactions, showing that the cost of transaction
execution is an order of magnitude smaller than that of consensus.
Figure 19 and 20 demonstrate AHL+’s throughput with varying
numbers of clients on the cluster and on GCP. Figure 18 compares
the sharding throughput under KVStore versus Smallbank.
C.1 PoET+ vs. PoET
We evaluate the performance of PoET and PoET+based on Hyper-
ledger Sawtooth v0.8 implementation. On the local cluster, we run
4 nodes on each physical server, and impose 50 Mbps bandwidth
limit and 100ms latency on the network links. On GCP, we run each
node on an instance with 2 vCPUs, and the nodes are distributed
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Table 3: Latency (ms) between different regions on Google Cloud Platform.
Zone us-west1-b us-west2-a us-east1-b us-east4-b asia-east1-b asia-southeast1-b europe-west1-b europe-west2-a
us-west1-b 0.0 24.7 66.7 59.0 120.2 150.8 138.9 132.7
us-west2-a 24.7 0.0 62.9 60.5 129.5 160.5 140.4 136.1
us-east1-b 66.7 62.9 0.0 12.7 183.8 216.6 93.1 88.2
us-east4-b 59.1 60.4 12.7 0.0 176.6 208.4 81.9 75.6
asia-east1-b 118.7 129.5 184.9 176.6 0.0 50.5 255.5 252.5
asia-southeast1-b 150.8 160.5 216.7 208.3 50.6 0.0 288.8 283.8
europe-west1-b 138.9 140.5 93.2 81.8 255.7 288.7 0.0 7.1
europe-west2-a 132.1 134.9 88.1 76.6 252.1 283.9 7.1 0.0
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Figure 16: # View-changes of AHL+ on local cluster.
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Figure 18: Sharding with KVStore vs. Smallbank.
over 8 regions. We set l = log(N )2 , reducing the effective network
size to
√
N .
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Figure 19: Throughput with varying workload on GCP.
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Figure 20: Throughput with varying workload on local clus-
ter.
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Figure 21: PoET and PoET+ performance.
The block size is varied from 2MB to 8MB, and the block time
from 12s to 24s . As N increases, block propagation time, which
depends on block time and block size, increases and leads to higher
stale block rate and lower throughput, as shown in Figure 21 and
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Figure 22: PoET and PoET+’s stale block rate.
22. PoET+maintains up to 4× higher throughput because it reduces
the stale block rate significantly from 15% to 3% with N = 128.
C.2 Comparison of BFT protocols
Figure 2 compares the performance of four popular BFT imple-
mentations in blockchains, namely PBFT, Tendermint, IBFT and
Raft (both from Quorum). For this comparison, we used the key-
value benchmark in BLOCKBENCH. For Tendermint, we used the
provided tm-bench tool that benchmarks a simple key-value appli-
cation.
We examined throughputs with varying fault tolerance, as func-
tion of number of nodes, N , and varying workload, as function of
number of concurrent clients. In both settings, PBFT outperforms
the alternatives, except at N = 1where PBFT has lower throughput
than Tendermint because Hyperledger limits REST request rate at
around 400 requests per second. These results are due to the design
of Tendermint and IBFT, and due to the implementation of Raft in
Quorum.
Unlike PBFT that relies on a stable leader to drive consensus,
Tendermint and IBFT rotate leaders in a round-robin fashion. In
particular, nodes in Tendermint and IBFT may take many rounds,
with a new leader at every round, before agreeing on a block. A
node votes to change to a new round when its timer expires. Safety
is achieved via a locking mechanism in which a node locks on a
block after it receives more than 2f + 1 Prepare messages. Once
locked, it does not vote for other blocks. For liveness, the lock is
released when there are more than 2f + 1 Prepare messages for
another block in a later round. However, we observe that IBFT
suffers from deadlock, because its locks are not released properly.
In Tendermint, a new block can only be proposed when the previous
one is finalized because of locking and rotating the leader. This
lock-step execution of consensus is different from Hyperledger’s
PBFT where a leader pipelines many blocks before the first block is
finalized. In particular, a node can vote on many blocks at the same
time, if the blocks are assigned consecutive sequence numbers. Such
pipelined execution extracts more concurrency from the consensus
implementation, thereby achieving higher throughput.
Raft has a higher fault tolerance threshold than PBFT (N2 vs.
N
3 ),
therefore it is expected to have higher throughput. But we observed
a lower performance for a Raft-based blockchain (Quorum), than a
PBFT blockchain (Hyperledger). This is due to the naive integration
of Raft into Quorum, which fails to pipeline consensus execution.
More specifically, a node in Quorum first constructs a block, then it
runs Raft with other nodes to finalize the block. Next, it constructs
a new block and repeats these steps. Because a block is constructed
once the previous block is finalized, consensus happens in lockstep
and the overall throughput suffers as a result.
The difference between Tendermint and Quorum is primarily
due to blockchain features other than consensus. Tendermint bench-
mark uses a key-value application that simply stores data tuples
in memory, without any other blockchain features such as Merkle
trees and smart contract execution. In contrast, a transaction in
Quorum is expensive because of its execution in the EVM and
updates to various Merkle trees.
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